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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

offense, the commission of which is accomplished by giving
a check on a bank, in which the maker has insufficient
funds or credit to pay the game, and intent to defraud is
riot an element of the offense, or knowledge of the condition
of the maker's bank account. Drawing the check, without
sufficient funds on deposit to meet it, was the act the legislature intended to punish, in accord with the views expressed in State v. Pishner,gupra, and it makes no difference
whether the vendor or lender relies upon the financial ability of the maker, or the representation of funds in bank.
The reasoning in State v. Cunningham, supra, is apparently
based upon a false premise, i. e., the offense is committed
against the payee of the check. It is conceivable that business men and bankers had something to do with the passage
of the act, and the offense the Legislature intended to prohibit consists in the public nuisance resulting from the practice of putting worthless checks in circulation. Therefore
the offense could very well be committed, even though the
check were postdated.
-KENDALL
H. KEENEY.

DOES AN EXPRESS WAIVER OF SUBJACENT SUPPORT PRECLUDE INJUNCTION AGAINST DAMAGE TO AN UPPER VEIN OF
CoAL?-A decision has recently been handed' down by the
Supreme Court of Appeals which has a far-reaching effect
on the coal mining industry of the state, involving as it does
the respective rights of the owners of upper and lower
seams of coal. In this case' the plaintiff, owner of the
Sewickley vein of coal which overlies the Pittsburgh vein,
sought to enjoin the owner of the latter from mining his
coal in such a manner as would necessarily result in injury
to the plaintiff's mine, and in endangering the lives of his
workmen. The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to
show that the defendant could avoid such injury by use of
another method, or by changing the mine openings. Del Continental Coal Co. v. Connellaville By-Product Coal Co., 138 S. E. 737 (W. Va.
1927).
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fendant's deed contained a provision that it should have
the right to remove all coal without any liability for damages arising from such removal and without leaving any
support for overlying strata. The Court held that since
plaintiff had notice of the provisions of the defendant's
deed, it could not enjoin defendant from exercising its
rights in strict accordance with the terms of the deed, when
those rights were exercised in a proper manner, and that
damages having been paid for in advance, plaintiff could
not invoke the maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas"
to prevent such damages. Is there then no theory by which
the courts can adequately protect rights acquired by contract and still protect a valuable natural resource for the
use of the owner, and the benefit of the public at large?
It has been said that the subject matter of the law is
interests, 2 that is, human wants, claims and desires, and in
dealing with those interests it is impossible to secure all of
them, since they are conflicting. So the end of law is to
secure or satisfy as many interests as possible, and sacrifice as few as possible. 3 This modern movement in law is,
among other things a progress toward an equitable practicalization of the law, and of the interpretation and application of the law.4 In this application the rights of individuals are not looked at exclusively, but they are considered in relation to the rights of other individuals, and
particularly with respect to the interests of the public,
i. e., society as a whole. Dean Pound observes eight noteworthy changes taking place in this generation, 5 one of
these being a limitation on the right of the individual to use
his property. Courts in the past have said that an owner
of land might build a fence on his own land as high as he
pleases, and in so doing his motives cannot be enquired into, for to do otherwise would detract from his right of
2 See POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 91-93.
2 Pound, "The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines," 27 HARv.
L. REv. 195 (1914).
' See Hardman, "Stare Decisis

and the Modern Trend," 32 W.

VA.

L. QuAR.

163

(1926).
a POUND, SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw 185-190.

These changes as listed are:

(1)

Limitation on the use of property; (2) limitation on the freedom of contract;

(3)

limitation on the power of disposing of property; (4) limitation on the power of a
creditor or injured party to exact satisfaction; (5) revival of the "liability without

fault" Idea; (7) tendency to hold that public funds should respond for injuries to individuals by public agencies; (8) insistence upon the interest of society il dependent
members of the household.
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property. 6 But courts in later cases 7 have reached a contrary conclusion saying that the owner has the right to
make any beneficial use he may see fit to make of his own
property, if the benefit he seeks is not out of all reasonable
proportion to the injury caused another. 8 The maxim "sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" (so use your own property
as not to injure the rights of another) is the basis of the
latter conclusion.9
Do the facts of the principle case present a situation
where plaintiff can invoke the maxim? An owner of property may impose on it any burden, no matter how injurious or destructive, that is not inconsistent with his general
ownership, not violative of public policy, nor injurious to
the property of others. 10 And although an owner of land
is entitled to subjacent support for his land, 1 he may by
apt words in the deed surrender this right 12 and the sale of3
such subjacent support is not violative of public policy.
Such is the state of affairs in the principal case, the plaintiff taking with notice of the exemption of the defendant
from liability for damages. But does it necessarily follow
that the defendant can exercise his rights in any manner
he sees fit? The law should secure to the owner of property his reasonable wants with reqpect to the use of his
property, and in the exercising of his contract rights. What
is reasonable should depend on the facts of the particular
case. The evidence tended to show (and the trial court so
found) that defendant could have avoided injury to the
plaintiff by either of two ways, namely, by adopting a different method of removing his coal, or by changing the location of his section headings, and that to use either method
would be just as efficient and economical as the method the
defendant is now using.
It is submitted that if the defendant could have used
another method of mining which is equally as efficient and
Koblegard v. Hale, 60 W. Va. 37, 53 S. E. 793 (1906).
Barger in. Barringer, 151 N. C. 433, 66 S. E. 439, 26 L. R. A. N. S. 881 (1909)
Bush v. Mockett, 95 Neb. 552, 145 N. W. 1001 (1914) ; Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala.
381, 58 So. 283 (1912).
8 Bush v. Mockett, supra.
Bush v. Mockett, supra.
10Allerton v. N. Y. L. & W. Ry. Co., 199 N. Y. 489, 93 N. E. 270 (1910).
11 Goodykoontz v. White Star Mining Co., 94 W. Va. 654, 119 S. E. 862 (1923).
12 Griffin v. Coal Co., 69 W. Va. 480, 53 S. E. 24, 2 L. R. A. N. S. 1115 and note
(1906).

1 Godfrey v. Weyanoke Coal & Coke Co., 82 W. Va. 666, 97 S. E. 186 (1018).
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economical as the method he insists on using, and by the
use of which the upper seam of coal would be adequately
protected, while by pursuing the method of his choice the
upper seam will be destroyed, it would not be beyond the
power of a court of equity to direct the defendant to use
that method which will protect, rather than destroy the
upper seam. By so doing the court would not be impairing
the obligations of contract, nor taking the property of the
defendant without due process of law, but would only be
regulating the manner in which he should use and enjoy
his property. The chief difficulty with the application of
the maxim "sic utere" would be that the plaintiff must affirmatively show that one method of mining is equally as efficient as the other, and therefore that the defendant had
some ulterior motive in adopting the method he insists on
using. This would be a matter of expert testimony, which
would probably lead to long and expensive litigation. A
case whose facts are rather analogous to those -of the principal case is that of the Gulf Pipe Line Company v. The Pawnee-Tulsa Petroleum Company.14 There the plaintiff, who
bought land subject to the mining lease of the defendant
was granted an injunction against the defendant, preventing the defendant from drilling a well so near to the plaintiff's land as to endanger his property, and the lives of his
workmen, on the ground that the defendant would derive
no special benefit from drilling there, while the plaintiff
would be subjected to great injury, and despite the prior
rights of the defendant of which the plaintiff knew, the
court said the former must use his rights in such a manner
as not unnecessarily to injure the latter's inferior rights. 15
It would seem that the plaintiff in the principal case would
have had a much stronger case had it sought to enjoin the
defendant before defendant had started operating in the man.
ner complained of, for to do so now would subject the defendant to a heavy burden of expense to which he should
not be subjected.
But aside from the interests of the individuals in this particular case there are other and important interests appear" 34 Okla. 776, 127 Pac. 252 (1914).
" To the same effect see Gillespie v. American Zinc and Chemical Co., 247 Pa. 222,
93 Ati. 272 (1915).
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ing, to which the Court should have given some weight.
namely, the interests of the state in the conservation of natural resources. That there is such interest is evidenced by
the fact that many states have passed legislation to the effect
that such natural resources should not be wasted, and the
courts have gone a long way to hold such legislation constitutional, as a valid exercise of the police power.' Natural
gas has usually been the object of such legislation because
the necessity of conserving it, if it is to last long, is apparent to everyone. It is submitted that the conservation of
coal is just as important to the economic welfare of the
state as the conservation of gas, though at the present time
the supply is more plenteous. Our Supreme Court of Appeals has held valid legislation forbidding the excavation
of coal within five feet of the boundary line, 17 the court
recognizing the social interest in conserving it in the following language, "The mining of coal is one of the largest
industries carried on in the state * * * * and in the aid of
an industry so great and widely diffused the state as a
whole is interested."
It would seem that under the decision of the principal
case, the only remedy for the economically unsound result
reached therein would seem to be legislation, which in view
of the decisions of the courts, might well be held constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power, thus conserving to the state a valuable taxable resource as well as preserving millions of tons of coal for the use of the people.
But legislation would not seem to be necessary if under the
facts of the principal case it appeared that there are two
equally efficient methods of mining the coal, one of which
would not damage the plaintiff's coal, for the defendant
should not be allowed to make an anti-social use of his
superior rights, under the maxim "sic utere" or on broad
general grounds of public policy.
-JOHN

V. SANDERS.

Walla v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U. S. 300, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118 (1020) ; Ohio
W
Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 (1900); Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gan Co.. 220 U.
S. 61 (1911).
17 Maple v. John, 42 W. Va. 80, 24 S. E. 608 (1896).
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